University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law Faculty Publications

Spring 2014

The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug
Abuse
Richard C. Ausness
University of Kentucky College of Law, rausness@uky.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. Va. L. Rev.
1117 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse
Notes/Citation Information
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, No. 3 (Spring 2014), pp. 1117-1165

This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/330

SYMPOSIUM*
THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE

Richard C. Ausness*

I.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1118
INDIVIDUAL LAWSUITS ....................................................................... 1121

Liability Theories ......................................................................... 112~
1. Negligence ............................................................................. 1123
2. Strict Products Liability (Defective Design) .......................... 1123
3. Strict Products Liability (Failure to Warn) ............................ 1124
4. Breach ofImplied Warranty .................................................. 1125
5. Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes ................... 1126
6. Negligent Marketing .............................................................. 1126
7. Fraudulent Misrepresentation ................................................ 1128
8. Civil Conspiracy .................................................................... 1129
9. Malicious Conduct.. ............................................................... 1130
B. Defenses and Other Limitations on Liability . .............................. 1130
1. Lack of Causation .................................................................. 1130
2. Misuse .................................................................................... 1131
3. Wrongful Conduct... ............................................................... 113 2
4. Statute of Limitations ............................................................. 1133
CLASS ACTIONS .................................................................................. 1137
PARENS PATRIAE LAWSUITS ................................................................ 1146
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS .................................................................. 1156
A. Criminal Prosecution of Pharmaceutical Companies ................. 1157
B. Criminal Prosecution of Prescribing Physicians ........................ 1157
C. Criminal Prosecution of Pharmacists .......................................... 1161
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION .......................................................... 1163
A. Problems with a Litigation-Oriented Strategy ............................. 1163
B. Regulatory Alternatives to Litigation ........................................... 1164
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1165

A.

II.
III.
IV.

V.

•
Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968
University of Florida; LL.M. 1973 Yale University.

1117

1118

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 116

INTRODUCTION

OxyContin, a prescription pain reliever, was developed by the Purdue
Phanna phannaceutical company ("Purdue") and was marketed by that
company in conjunction with Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott,,).l Its active
ingredient is oxycodone hydrochloride, a synthetic opioid that was developed
in 1916? Oxycodone is found in other analgesic products such as Percocet,
Percodan, and Tylox. 3 OxyContin is designed to control moderate to severe
chronic pain.4 Most oxycodone-based products provide pain relief for only four
to six hours. 5 However, OxyContin has a patented time-release feature that
allows oxycodone to be released over a twelve hour period, which reduces the
need for repeated dosing. 6 Because of this time-release feature, OxyContin
typically contains a larger dose of oxycodone than other competing pain
relievers. 7

Purdue Pharma entered into a promotion agreement with Abbott Laboratories. See
Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ohio 2004). This agreement provided
that the two companies would both promote OxyContin and that Purdue would pay Abbott a
commission on net sales of the drug. Id
See Paul D. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial Liability in the
Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. liS, 132 (2008). The term "opioids" refers to a
group of chemicals related to opium, an analgesic, euphoric, and narcotic substance derived from
the poppy plant. See Scott Burris et aI., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the
Provision of Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, I DREXEL L. REv. 273, 281 (2009).
According to one commentator, "opioid chemicals bind to the opioid receptors in the central
nervous system and provide an analgesic effect because they decrease and alter the sensation of
pain." Ed Woodworth, Pharmageddon: A Statutory Solution to Curb Ohio's Prescription Abuse
Problem, 26J.L.&HEALTH 103, 108(2013).
David L. Robinson, Note, Bridging the Gaps: Improved Legislation to Prohibit the Abuse
ofPrescription Drugs in Virginia, 9 APPALACHIAN J.L. 281, 283 (2010).
4
See Melissa M. Ferrara, Comment, The Disparate Treatment of Addiction-Assistance
Medications and Opiate Pain Medications Under the Law: Permitting the Proliferation of
Opiates and Limiting Access to Treatment, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 741, 741 (2012). In the
1980s, physicians began to prescribe opioids more aggressively to treat cancer patients. See
Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 696 (E.D. Ky. 2003). Purdue Pharma,
however, promoted the use of opioids, such as OxyContin, to treat other forms of chronic pain.
See Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public
Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 222-23 (2009).
Id
6
Joseph B. Prater, Comment, West Virginia's Painful Settlement: How the OxyContin
Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability May Make Pharmaceutical
Companies Liablefor Black Markets, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1409, 1413 (2006).
Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ohio 2004). OxyContin currently
comes in 10,20,40,80, and 160 milligram strengths. See Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
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Purdue began marketing OxyContin in 1996.8 Although in the past
oxycodone and similar pain relieving drugs were usually prescribed for cancer
patients, Purdue aggressively promoted OxyContin as a treatment for persons
with "non-malignant" diseases such as arthritis or chronic back pain. Sales of
the product grew from $48 million in 1996 to almost $1.1 billion in 2000,9 and
OxyContin eventually became the most prescribed Schedule II narcotic drug in
the United States. IO By 2009, physicians wrote more than six million
prescriptions for OxyContin and retail sales of the drug reached $3 billion. II
Unfortunately, the popularity of OxyContin as a pain reliever also led to
widespread abuse of the drug, particularly in rural areas such as Appalachia. 12
In the words of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
Such areas have become a breeding ground for OxyContin
abuse because "they're home to large populations of disabled
and chronically ill people who are in need of pain relief;
they're marked by high unemployment and a lack of economic
opportunity; they're remote, far from the network of Interstates
and metropolises through which heroin and cocaine travel; and
they're areas where prescription drugs have been abusedthough in much smaller numbers-in the past.,,13
Drug abusers are able to defeat OxyContin's time-release coating by
crushing the pill and snorting it or by administering it intravenously.14 They
are able to obtain large amounts of OxyContin in various ways. "Pill mills" are
one source of illicit drugs. A pill mill is a physician, pain management clinic, or
pharmacy that prescribes or dispenses prescription narcotics inappropriately or
for non-medical purposes. IS Pill mills are characterized by payment in cash
only, no physical exams, treatment with pain medication only, and large crowds

The FDA approved OxyContin on December 12, 1995. See Ferrara, supra note 4, at 749.
Van Zee, supra note 4, at 221.
Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating
the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 231,
273 (2008).
10

II

See Ferrara, supra note 4, at 741-42.
See Robinson, supra note 3, at 284.
13
See Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 696 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (quoting
Paul Tough,
The Alchemy of OxyContin, N.Y. TIMEs (July 29,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.coml200 1107/29/magazine/the-alchemy-ofoxycontin.html?src=pm&pagewanted= 1&pagewanted=all).
14
Sheryl Calabro, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing the
Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 2241, 2245 (2004).
12

15

Woodworth, supra note 2, at 113-14.
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waiting to be seen. 16 Another technique, known as "doctor shopging," involves
receiving treatment from more than one physician concurrently. 7 Drug abusers
will often visit multirle physicians in order to obtain multiple prescriptions of
their preferred drug. I Some drug abusers also engage in "pharmacy diversion,"
which occurs when employees forge prescriptions or simply remove
OxyContin from pharmacy shelves. 19 Another form of pharmacy diversion
involves robberies and burglaries by criminals seeking to obtain prescription
drugs. 20
The drug abuse problems described above have prompted a number of
responses by both drug users (and abusers) and by various federal and state
government agencies. Many of these responses have involved civil litigation
against Purdue and others, including individual lawsuits, class actions and
parens patriae suits by state officials. On the whole, individual lawsuits and
class actions have not been very successful. Parens patriae suits brought by
state attorneys general against the manufacturer of OxyContin have fared better
and have led to some fairly generous settlements for the states involved. On the
other hand, criminal prosecutions have generally been more successful in the
sense that the government has achieved a high conviction rate in these cases.
However, it is less certain whether criminal prosecutions have actually had
much impact on the underlying drug abuse problem. This Article concludes that
litigation, both civil and criminal, is a valuable tool in the war against
prescription drug abuse. However, it is only part of the solution. Other
measures, such as prescription monitoring programs, anti-doctor shopping
laws, and unused prescription drug collection programs, also have an important
role to play.
Part I examines the impressive array of liability theories that individual
litigants have relied upon in their lawsuits against Purdue. These theories
include: negligence; strict products liability, including design defect and
inadequate warning claims; breach of the implied warranty of merchantability;
violation of state consumer protection statutes; negligent marketing; fraudulent
misrepresentation; civil conspiracy; and "malicious conduct." Purdue, in turn,
has pursued an aggressive "no settlement" policy and has chosen to spend a
considerable amount of money on legal fees instead of providing compensation
to individuals with addiction or other health problems. 2 The company managed
16
Ashley Dutko, Florida's Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse: Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program, 34 NOVAL. REv. 739, 744 (2010).
17
See Amy L. Cadwell, Note, In the War on Prescription Drug Abuse, E-Pharmacies Are
Making Doctor Shopping I"elevant, 7 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 85, 89-90 (2006).
18
See Robinson, supra note 3, at 289.
19
See Prater, supra note 6, at 1416.
20
See Ken Lammers, Jr., Rise ofthe Pills, 15 D.C. L. REv. 91, 95 (2011).
21
See Frederickson, supra note 2, at 134.
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to win most of these cases at the summary judgment level by claiming no
causation, misuse, wrongful conduct, or expiration of the statute of limitations.
Part II considers the history of class actions in this area and concludes
that in many instances the courts have denied class certification because
representatives of the putative class have been unable to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a). Commonality has been the most troublesome
roadblock to class certification, but courts have also denied class certification
for failure to satisfy other requirements such as numerosity, typicality, and
adequacy.
Part III discusses parens patriae lawsuits. These are lawsuits brought
against Purdue by state attorneys general to protect or vindicate the state's
"quasi-sovereign" interests in the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens. 22 Part
III concludes that these lawsuits have been more successful than other forms of
civil litigation for various reasons. In the first place, state officials can muster
more effective legal resources than individual litigants. Secondly, governmental
litigants are not subject to the conduct-based defenses that have been invoked
to defeat individual plaintiffs in product misuse cases.
Part IV examines criminal prosecutions of Purdue, physicians who
overprescribe opioid drugs, and pharmacists who supply these products to drug
abusers. Finally, Part V assesses the effectiveness of civil and criminal
litigation as a tactic in the fight against drug abuse, particularly as it relates to
OxyContin use. After evaluating the various categories of civil litigation, the
Article examines other approaches that are currently employed to combat drug
abuse or might be employed in the future. One such approach is criminal
prosecution of opioid producers, physicians who overprescribe these drugs, and
pharmacies that operate as "pill mills" to supply narcotic products to drug
abusers. Another strategy is to establish an effective monitoring program to
oversee opioid use by residents of a state. Another initiative would be the
enactment of anti-doctor-shopping laws to discourage drug abusers from
obtaining drugs in this manner. A final approach would be to implement "take
back" programs to provide for the safe disposal of unwanted prescription drugs.
1.

INDIVIDUAL LAWSUITS

Private civil litigation includes individual lawsuits and class actions,
but it excludes qui tam actions brought by private individuals on behalf of the
government. 23 This latter category will not be discussed because they involve

22
See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and the
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REv. 913, 931 (2008).
23
Most of the damage awards collected by the federal government from drug companies have
resulted from qui tam actions brought by private parties on behalf of the government. See
Fredrickson, supra note 2, at 124. These lawsuits are authorized by the False Claims Act, 31
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purely economic claims rather than personal injury claims. A number of
individuals have brought suit against Purdue, contending that the company is
responsible for the consequences of their drug abuse and addiction.2 4 However,
Purdue has won most of these cases on summary judgment by successfully
raising issues such as lack of causation,2 5 misuse, wrongful conduct,27 or
28
running of the statute of limitations.
A.

Liability Theories

Plaintiffs in individual lawsuits have invoked a variety of conventional
and novel liability theories to support their claims. These include negligence,2 9
strict products liability, 3 0 failure to warn, 3 ' breach of implied warranty, 32

U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000), a Civil War era statute that imposes liability on anyone who
submits a false or fraudulent claim to the government for payment. See Richard C. Ausness,
"There's Danger Here, Cherie!": Liability for the Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and
Medical Devices for Off-Label Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1253, 1275 (2008). These individuals,
known as relators, may be private citizens, government employees, employees of private
contractors, employees, or ex-employees of the defendant in question or even competitors of the
defendant. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuit as Monitoring Devices in
Governing Contracting,29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1799, 1812 (1996). If the lawsuit is successful, the
relator receives a share of the recovery. See Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the
Government's Interests: Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government's
Right to Veto Settlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1053-54 (1998). There have
been several qui tam actions brought against Purdue Pharma involving the company's promotion
of OxyContin. See United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 5:10-cv-01423, 2012
WL 4056720 (S.D.W. Va. 2012); United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 582 F.
Supp. 2d 766 (W.D. Va. 2008), af'd,600 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010).
24
See Calabro,supra note 14, at 2246.
25
See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Foister v.
Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
26
See Foister,295 F. Supp. 2d 693; Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
27
See Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d 693; Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss.
2006).
28
See Freund v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382 (E.D. Wis. 2006);
Franz v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 05-CV-201-PB, 2006 WL 455998 (D.N.H. 2006); Bayless v.
Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 771 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011).
29
See Franz,2006 WL 455998; Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss. 2006).
30
See Franz, 2006 WL 455998; McCauley v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449
(W.D. Va. 2004); Price,920 So. 2d 479.
31
See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Freund,2006
WL 482382; Franz,2006 WL 455998; McCauley, 331 F. Supp. 2d 449; Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d
693.
32
See Freund,2006 WL 482382; Franz,2006 WL 455998.
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violation of state consumer protection statutes,33 negligent marketing,34
fraudulent misrepresentation,3 civil conspiracy36 and "malicious conduct." 3 7
Some of these theories have not been discussed in court opinions because the
cases were dismissed on other grounds. Nevertheless, each of these liability
theories will be examined in the context of OxyContin litigation.
1.

Negligence

Although several plaintiffs have included negligence counts in their
complaints,38 in each case, the court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment without discussing the merits of the respective negligence
claims. Presumably, however, these claims could have been based either on the
inadequacy of the drug's time-release coating or on overpromotion of the drug
by Purdue.
2.

Strict Products Liability (Defective Design)

In three cases, plaintiffs brought strict products liability claims against
Purdue.39 In order to prevail under strict products liability, a plaintiff must
prove that the product is defective in some way. In general, a product may be
defectively manufactured, defectively designed, or defective because of
inadequate warnings or instructions. 4 0 There was no evidence in any of these
cases that OxyContin was defectively manufactured, and failure to warn claims
are discussed below. This leaves defective design. The only bases for a
defective design claim would be (1) the amount of oxycodone in the larger dose
pills was excessive, (2) the manufacturer failed to add an antagonist substance
to the pills, or (3) the time-release mechanism was defective because it was not
tamper proof.
The first type of claim would probably fail because the high dose of
oxycodone, coupled with the time-release feature, provides pain relief for a
longer period than other pain medication. This therapeutic benefit would
arguably justify the increased risk of abuse. The second defect claim is
3
See Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.D.C. 2003); Labzda v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Bayless, 2011 WL 6117927.
34
See Koenig, 435 F. Supp. 2d 551; Freund,2006 WL 482382; McCauley, 331 F. Supp. 2d
449; Williams, 297 F. Supp. 2d 171; Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346.
3s
See Freund,2006 WL 482382; Franz,2006 WL 455998; Price, 920 So. 2d 479.
36 See Koenig, 435 F. Supp. 2d 551; Franz,2006 WL 455998.
37
See Freund,2006 WL 482382; Price,920 So. 2d 479.
38
See Franz, 2006 WL 455998; Price,920 So. 2d 479.
3
See Franz,2006 WL 455998; McCauley, 331 F. Supp. 2d 449; Price, 920 So. 2d 479.

4

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILYTY

§

2 (1998).
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stronger: namely that Purdue's failure to add an antagonistic drug to OxyContin
might constitute a design defect. 4 1 Antagonistic formulations can help to protect
against drug overdoses by suppressing the euphoric effects that are otherwise
associated with opioid use. The producers of other opioid drugs have
apparently added antagonists to their products without seriously impairing the
analgesic effects of their products. Purdue's failure to do so arguably
constitutes a design defect. Finally, plaintiffs can maintain that OxyContin is
defective because its patented time-release mechanism can be easily
bypassed.43 However, even if this does constitute a design defect, Purdue could
raise a misuse or alteration defense to such a claim, at least when brought by a
drug abuser.4
3.

Strict Products Liability (Failure to Warn)

Although plaintiffs brought failure to warn claims in a number of
cases, 4 5 Foisterv. Purdue Pharma,L.P.4 6 was the only case that addressed the
merits of such a claim. The plaintiffs in that case alle ed that Purdue failed to
warn them about the addictive nature of OxyContin. The court determined
that comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was applicable.48
This provision declared that an "unavoidably unsafe" product would not be
subject to strict liability as long as the manufacturer provided an adequate
warning about the product's inherent dangers. 49 The court reviewed the

41
See Harris v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 218 F.R.D. 590, 592 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Wethington v.
Purdue Pharma, 218 F.R.D. 577, 586 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821
N.E.2d 141, 144 (Ohio 2004).
42
See Harris, 218 F.R.D. at 592; Wethington, 218 F.R.D. at 586; Howland, 821 N.E.2d at

144.
43
4

See Prater,supra note 6, at 1419.
See Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2003).

45
See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Freund v.
Purdue Pharma Co., No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382 (E.D. Wis. 2006); Franz v. Purdue Pharma
Co., No. 05-CV-201-PB, 2006 WL 455998 (D.N.H. 2006); McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 449 (W.D. Va. 2004); Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D.
Ky. 2003).
46
Foister,295 F. Supp. 2d 693.
47
48

Id. at 705.
d

See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict ProductsLiability: What
Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of PharmaceuticalProducts?, 78 KY. L.J. 705,
712-19 (1989-90). Unlike § 402A, the Products Liability Restatement does not contain a
provision similar to comment k. However, it does have a separate provision that addresses the
liability of drug and medical device manufacturers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 6 (1998).
49
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language of the package insert and observed that it explicitly warned that
chewing or crushing OxyContin pills could release a potentially toxic dose of
oxycodone.so The insert also clearly warned that OxyContin could be addictive
and was a "common target for both drug abusers and drug addicts."51 On the
basis of this evidence, the court concluded that the warning provided on the
package insert was adequate to satisfy the requirements of comment k.2
The Foister court also held that Kentucky would probably adopt the
learned intermediary rule. This rule provides that the manufacturer of a
prescription drug is not required to warn the ultimate user or consumer, but
may satisfy its duty to warn by communicating information about a drug's
inherent risks to the prescribing physician.54 The physician, in turn, is expected
to act as a "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and the patient.5 5
Because the package insert warnings were adequate and were communicated to
the plaintiffs' physicians, the court concluded that Purdue had fully satisfied its
duty to warn.
4.

Breach of Implied Warranty

Several plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to recover against Purdue for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.57 In Freund v. Purdue
Pharma Co., 58 the court apparently granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment because it concluded that the applicable statute of
limitations had run.59 The plaintiff in Franz v. Purdue Pharma Co.60 also sued

50
51

Foister,295 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
Id. at 707.

52

Id. at 705.

53

Id. at 706.

54
See Lloyd C. Chatfield, Note, Medical Implant Litigation and Failure to Warn: A New
Extension for the Learned Intermediary Rule?, 82 KY. L.J. 575 (1994); Yonni D. Fushman,
Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.: Toward Creating a Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertisement
Exception to the LearnedIntermediaryDoctrine, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2000).
5
See Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing PracticesLead to Greater Tort
LiabilityforPrescriptionDrug Manufacturers?,37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 97, 107 (2002).
56
Foister,295 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
See Freund v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382 (E.D. Wis. 2006);
5
Franz v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 05-CV-201-PB, 2006 WL 455998 (D.N.H. 2006).
5
Freund,2006 WL 482382.

Id. at * 1. The court observed that although the warranty claim was not subject to the two
s9
year statute of limitations, it accepted the defendants' uncontested assertion that the claim could
not survive under Wisconsin law. Id. at *2 n.2. The court did not disclose the basis for this
assertion so it may not have involved the statute of limitations.
6
Franz, 2006 WL 455998.
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for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.6'The court dismissed
most of the plaintiffs other claims because the two-year statute of limitations
had run.62 However, the breach of warranty claim was not time barred because
it was subject to a four-year statute of limitations.63 Nevertheless, the court
dismissed the warranty claim as well because the plaintiff failed to allege that
she gave notice of her claim to the defendants, as required by the Uniform
Commercial Code,64 before filing her lawsuit. 65
5.

Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes

A number of states have enacted consumer protection laws.66 In some
cases, plaintiffs have sought to rely on these statutes, largely without success,
to impose liability on Purdue. For example, in Bayless v. PurdueFrederick Co.,
Inc.,6 the plaintiffs brought suit under the Connecticut Products Liability Act
("CPLA"). The drug company asserted that the CPLA claims were barred by
the statute of limitations, but the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with
their case.69
6.

Negligent Marketing

A number of plaintiffs have brought damage claims against Purdue on
the basis of negligent marketing. 70 As its name implies, this relatively new
liability theory, which is often referred to as "overpromotion," is based on
negligence principles rather than principles of strict products liability.71 If a
court concludes that a manufacturer or other seller has engaged in negligent
marketing, it may impose liability for harm caused by a product even though

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
63
Id. at *3 n.5.
6
See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-607(3)(a) (2014).
65
Franz, 2006 WL 482382, at *3.
66
See generally MARSHALL S. SHAPO, SHAPO ON THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7.06
(2012).
67
Bayless v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 771 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011).
61

62

68

69

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-577a(a)

(2014).

Bayless, 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 771.
70
See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Labzda v.
Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
7
See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead,
Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 795-96 (1996).
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the product is not defective. 72 The doctrine of negligent marketing rests on the
notion that product sellers should not pursue marketing strategies that increase
the risk that their products will be purchased by persons who are likely to injure
themselves or to injure others.73 Negligent marketing claims can be based on
product design, advertising or promotional activities, and distribution
practices. 74
Purdue may have engaged in each of these forms of negligent
marketing. First, one could argue that the OxyContin pill was designed to
appeal to drug abusers. It contained much higher quantities of oxycodone than
other pain medication, as much as 160 milligrams per pill. In addition, the timerelease mechanism was easy to defeat, thereby allowing drug abusers to
achieve a heroin-like high. The argument for negligent promotion is even
stronger. It should be noted that drug companies use a variety of marketing
techniques to promote their products and most of them are legitimate when not
abused. However, considering that the product involved was a highly
dangerous Schedule II narcotic, Purdue's promotional activities may have
crossed the line. For example, between 1996 and 2001, more than 5000 health
care professionals attended all-expense paid conferences at various resorts
where they were invited by the company to join its national speakers'
76
program. Purdue also funded more than 20,000 educational programs, thereby
influencing the prescribing of OxyContin in the United States. 77 In addition,
Purdue promoted OxyContin among primary care physicians in an effort to
encourage them to prescribe opioids more frequently. Furthermore, it
encouraged its sales representatives to promote OxyContin aggressively and
even provided them with free starter coupons to give to doctors for eventual
distribution to their patients.79 Finally, in an effort to increase the use of
OxyContin to treat non-cancer related chronic pain, the company in its

See Ausness, supra note 55, at 123.
n
See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liabilityfor the Sale of Non-Defective Products:An Analysis
and Critique ofthe Concept ofNegligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REv. 907, 912 (2002).
74
See McClurg, supra note 71, at 806-18.
7
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of Marketing Relationships Between Physicians and
the Drug andDevice Industry, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 332-34 (2010) (describing some of these
practices); Marshall B. Kapp, Drug Companies, Dollars, and the Shaping of American Medical
Practice,29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 237, 247-61 (2005).
76
See Van Zee, supra note 4, at 221.
n
Id. at 225.
78
Id. at 222.
7
Id.
72
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marketing and promotion activities downplayed the risk of addiction from longterm opioid use.80
In Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,8 ' the parents of a deceased drug

abuser relied on the concept of negligent marketing, claiming that the
defendants knew that a particular physician was over-prescribing OxyContin to
his patients, but they "did not attempt to curtail the inappropriate prescriptions,
ignoring the potential for abuse of their product."8 However, the court
concluded that the product was not defective and the manufacturer provided
adequate warnings to the medical community.
In addition, the court
determined that there was no special relationship between the defendants and
the decedent that would impose a duty on the drug company to control the
overprescribing of OxyContin.84 Finally, the court ruled that neither state nor
federal law imposed a duty on the defendants to report the physician to the
authorities.s
7.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Purdue has been accused of training its sales representatives to "falsely
promote the opioid analgesic as less likely than other pain medications to cause
abuse, addiction, tolerance, and withdrawal."8
In addition, "healthcare
providers were deliberately misinformed that the extended-release formulation
rendered oxycodone extraction more difficult and therefore decreased the
potential for abuse, and that lack of euphoria rendered it less addictive than
immediate-release opiates or even morphine." This conduct, if true, fits the
description of intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation, and several plaintiffs
have alleged as much in their pleadings. 8
According to one court, a fraudulent representation claim requires
proof of the following by clear and convincing evidence:
Id. at 223. Purdue also promoted OxyContin to the general public through its website,
"Partners Against Pain." See Prater,supra note 6, at 1430 n.172.
81
Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
82
Id. at 1348-49.
8
Id. at 1353.
84
Id. at 1355.
80

85

Id.

8
See Lammers, supra note 20, at 91 (quoting Yael Waknine, FalsePromotion of OxyContin
(May
11,
2007),
Frederick $600
Million,
MEDSCAPE
Costs
Purdue
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/556381).
87
Id
88
See Freund v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382, at *1 (E.D. Wis.
2006); Franz v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 05-CV-201-PB, 2006 WL 455998, at *1 (D.N.H. 2006);
Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479,482 (Miss. 2006).
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1) a representation; 2) which is material to the transaction at
hand; 3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or
recklessness as to whether it is true or false; 4) with the intent
of misleading another into relying on it; 5) justifiable reliance
on the misrepresentation; and 6) the resulting injury was
proximately caused by the reliance. 89
The statements and assurances made by Purdue's sales representatives
to physicians arguably satisfy the first four elements. Whether a plaintiff could
prove the fifth element would depend upon how familiar the target physician
was with opioids in general and OxyContin in particular. The sixth element
might also be a problem if the plaintiff had independent knowledge of the
addictive qualities of OxyContin and consumed the drug anyway. In any event,
these issues have not been litigated in the context of individual lawsuits
because the three suits in which fraud was alleged were dismissed prior to
trial. 90
8.

Civil Conspiracy

In several cases, individual plaintiffs have accused Purdue of engaging
in a civil conspiracy. 91 A civil conspiracy involves a group of two or more
persons acting together to achieve an unlawful objective or to achieve a lawful
objective by unlawful or criminal means.92 The civil conspiracy claim rests on
an allegation that Purdue and its partner, Abbott, engaged in a civil conspiracy
to increase OxyContin's market share by misrepresenting its risks and benefits
to the medical community. 9 3 However, in both cases, the plaintiffs' lawsuits
were dismissed on other grounds, so their civil conspiracy claims were not
actually adjudicated.94

89
See Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citing
Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).
90
See Freund,2006 WL 482382, at *1; Franz, 2006 WL 455998, at *1; Price,920 So. 2d at
482.
91
See Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 557 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Franz,
2006 WL 455998, at *1.
92
See In re Personal Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1095 (D. N.D. 1990);
Belkow v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1547, 1550 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am.
Land Corp., 141 N.W.2d 36, 48 (Mich. 1966); Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900
S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. 1995).
9
See Koenig, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 557; Franz, 2006 WL 455998, at *1.

94

Id
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Malicious Conduct

Finally, plaintiffs in two cases accused Purdue of engaging in
"malicious conduct."95 However, in neither case did they define what they
meant by malicious conduct. 96 Nor did the plaintiffs disclose whether malicious
conduct was an independent claim or whether it was made in support of a claim
for punitive damages. As with so many other novel claims, the plaintiffs'
lawsuits were dismissed on other grounds so the courts never got around to
deciding what might constitute malicious conduct in these cases.
B.

Defenses and OtherLimitations on Liability

Purdue won all but one of the cases surveyed. In each instance, the
defendant prevailed on a motion for summary judgment, either by showing that
the plaintiff had failed to prove an essential element of his or her theory of
liability or by successfully invoking an affirmative defense.
1.

Lack of Causation

Proving causation is a serious problem for individual plaintiffs,
particularly when they have abused pain medication before their initial
exposure to OxyContin.97 The following two cases illustrate the causation
problems plaintiffs may encounter in OxyContin cases. One involves cause-infact, while the other is more concerned with proximate cause.
In Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 9 8 the plaintiff brought suit against
Abbott, which co-promoted OxyContin along with Purdue, and alleged that the
drug company's "promotional marketing campaign failed to adequately warn
doctors about the addiction risks of OxyContin and affirmatively
misrepresented and minimized those risks in order to increase OxyContin
sales." 99 The plaintiff also claimed that his physician prescribed OxyContin,
causing him to become addicted and suffer adverse health consequences as a
result.'0 0 However, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary

See Freund,2006 WL 482382; Price,920 So. 2d 479.
However, at least one court has defined malicious conduct as "a purposeful act
or
conscious omission to do an act with the intent to do wrong or cause injury." Matthews v. State,
825 P.2d 224, 230 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
9
See Prater,supra note 6, at 1419.
98
Koenig, 435 F. Supp. 2d 551.
9
Id. at 553.
9

96

1"

Id.

THE FIGHTAGAINST PRESCRIPTIONDRUG ABUSE

2014]

113 1

judgment, concluding that Mr. Koenig produced no evidence of a causal
connection between Abbott's co-promotion of OxyContin and his injuries. 1'
It appears that Abbott did not contact the plaintiffs physician, Dr.
Danshaw, until nearly two years after the physician had begun treating Koenig
with OxyContin.102 Consequently, the court determined that Abbott's
promotional activities did not cause Dr. Danshaw to prescribe OxyContin and,
therefore, did not cause the plaintiffs injuries. 0 3 Lack of causation also
resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiffs failure to warn claim against
Purdue.'1 Dr. Danshaw testified that he was aware of the addiction risks
associated with the use of opioids like OxyContin and chose to prescribe it
anyway. 0 5 Therefore, even if Purdue's warning was inadequate, this deficiency
would not have influenced Dr. Danshaw's decision to prescribe OxyContin to
the plaintiff.106
Another federal district court held in favor of Purdue on proximate
cause grounds. In Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.,07 seven plaintiffs brought
suit against Purdue and alleged that the company failed to adequately warn
about the risk of addiction from OxyContin.108 However, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs' conduct, which included intentional alteration of the product
and ignoring dosing instructions, was a superseding cause that severed any
causal connection between OxyContin and their injuries.' 09
2.

Misuse

Misuse, in the sense of putting a product to a clearly improper use, will
bar recovery of a product liability claim in most states.110 Purdue has been
successful in asserting this defense to defeat claims against it by drug
abusers."' For example, in Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,1 2 the plaintiffs
alleged that their adult son, Michael Labzda, died as the result of an overdose

101

Id.

102

Id. at 554.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 555.
id
Id. at 555-56.
Foister v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 295 F. Supp.2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003).

105
106
107
10

Id. at 705.

'0

Id. at 703.

See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTs LIABILIY LAW § 13.5 (2d ed. 2008).
See Foister, 295 F. Supp. 2d 693; Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
112
Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346.
110
"'
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of OxyContin prescribed by Dr. Deonarine." 3 The plaintiffs contended that the
drug manufacturer knew that Dr. Deonarine overprescribed OxyContin to many
of his patients, including their son, but did nothing to curtail this practice." 4
The defendant argued that Michael Labzda's intentional misuse of OxyContin
was sufficient to bar recovery.' 5 The court declared that the decedent had a
long history of drug abuse, dating from his days in high school."' 6 On the night
of his death, he drank 14 beers and at least two rum and Cokes." 7 In addition,
he shared five marijuana cigarettes, took three tablets of the strongest strength
of Xanax and crushed and snorted one and a half to two 80 milligram tablets of
OxyContin." 8 Based on this evidence, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the doctrine of comparative negligence should permit at least
some recovery."' 9 Instead, the court relied on Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.' 2 0
to conclude that the decedent's behavior was not merely negligent, but
constituted product misuse and, therefore, barred any recovery. 121
3.

Wrongful Conduct

Some states also have a rule that "wrongful conduct" will prevent a
plaintiff who has engaged in illegal conduct from recovering for harm caused
by such actions. 12 2 This doctrine has been successfully invoked by Purdue in
several cases.123 For example, Price v. Purdue Pharma Co.1 24 affirmed a
summary judgment in favor of the drug company because it concluded that the
plaintiff had engaged in illegal and wrongful conduct.125 In that case, the
plaintiff sued various doctors, pharmacies, and drug companies for injuries he

"3 Id. at 1348. Dr. Deonarine was subsequently prosecuted by the State of Florida for drug
trafficking. See Deonarine v. State, 967 So. 2d 333, 335-36 (Fla. D.C.A. 2007).
114
Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49.
115

Id at 1356.

116

Id at 1350.

117

Id

"9

Id at 1356.

Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2001), affd, 31 Fed.
App'x 932 (11th Cir. 2002).
121
Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
122
See, e.g., Pappas v. Clark, 494 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Orzel v. Scott Drug Co.,
537 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1995).
123
See Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 704-05 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Price v.
Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 484-86 (Miss. 2006).
124
Price,920 So. 2d 479.
120

125

Id. at 481.
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allegedly sustained from ingesting OxyContin.12 6 The evidence showed that
between November 1999 and October 2000, the plaintiff visited ten different
physicians from ten different clinics in two cities and used seven pharmacies in
three cities in order to obtain enough OxyContin to satisfy his drug habit.127
Applying the maxim that "[n]o Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his
cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act,"l 2 8 the court declared that the
plaintiffs "doctor shopping" was illegal because it violated federal drug
restrictions.129 According to the court, the plaintiffs violation of the law was
"not merely a condition, but instead [it was] an integral and essential part of his
case and the contributing cause of his alleged injury."' 30 Consequently, the
court held that the plaintiff's claims were barred.131
4.

Statute of Limitations

Finally, Purdue has sought to defeat claims against it by OxyContin
users by contending that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 32in
each case, the plaintiffs argued that the court should apply the discovery rule to
toll the statute of limitations. 3 3 The first of these cases was Franz v. Purdue
Pharma Co.,134 an unreported case from a New Hampshire federal district
court. The plaintiff s physician first prescribed OxyContin in 1996 to alleviate a
painful condition.' 35 In October 2000, the plaintiff was hospitalized for
addiction and withdrawal symptoms.' 36 In April 2004, she filed suit against
Purdue and Abbott, claiming that OxyContin was defective, that the defendants
made fraudulent misrepresentations about its efficacy, and that they failed to

126

127
128
129

id
Id. at 482.
Id. at 484 (quoting Morrissey v. Bologna, 123 So. 2d 537, 545 (Miss. 1960)).
Price,920 So. 2d. at 484.

130

Id. at 485.

1'

Id. at 486.

See Franz v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 05-CV-201-PB, 2006 WL 455998 (D.N.H. 2006);
Freund v. Purdue Pharma Co., No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382 (E.D. Wis. 2006); Bayless v.
Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 771 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011).
133 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations starts to run at the time of the plaintiffs injury. See
OwEN, supra note 110, § 14.5. However, the discovery rule provides that a cause of action does
not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, relevant facts about the injury. Id. Although the discovery rule was first applied in
medical malpractice cases, it is now applicable to products liability cases. Id.
'
Franz, 2006 WL 455998.
135 Id at *1.
136
Id at *2.
132
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provide adequate instructions and warnings.' 37 In response, the defendants
maintained that the applicable two-year statute of limitations began to run in
October 2000 when the plaintiff was hospitalized for addiction, and expired in
October 2002 more than a year before she filed her complaint against them.138
On the other hand, the plaintiff contended that she did not become aware of the
defendants' wrongdoing at that time because when her physician first
prescribed OxyContin, he assured the plaintiff that the drug was not
addictive.' 39 According to the plaintiff, it was not until April 2003, when she
heard about problems with OxyContin on a television program, that she first
became aware that the defendants might be responsible for her drug addiction

problem.14 0
Citing Curry v. A.H. Robins Co.,141 the court acknowledged that the
discovery rule did not require that a person have actual knowledge of the
defendant's wrongful conduct; instead, it provided that the statute of limitations
would start to run when "a reasonable person would have realized [that her
injuries] might have been the result of actionable conduct." 4 2 Applying this
test to the plaintiff s case, the court in Franz concluded that even if the plaintiff
did not have actual knowledge of the connection between OxyContin use and
her addiction until April 2003, she should have realized as early as October
2000 that her injuries might have been caused by the defendants' conduct when
she was admitted to the hospital for OxyContin related illness. 143 Accordingly,
the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.14 4
Freund v. PurduePharma Co.14 5 was also concerned with whether the
discovery doctrine would toll the statute of limitations in OxyContin addiction
cases. The plaintiff in that case began taking OxyContin in early 2001 when it
was prescribed by her physician as treatment for chronic pain.14 6 In July of that
year, the plaintiff intentionally took an overdose of OxyContin because she felt
that "the best way out of addiction was to kill myself." 47 Eventually, she was
weaned off of OxyContin and had not taken the drug since December 2002.148

Id at *1-2.

137

138
Id. at *2.
139id
140
141
142

143

w
145
146
147
148

SId

id.
775 F.2d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1985).
Franz,2006 WL 455998, at *2 (quoting Curry, 775 F.2d at 216).
Id. at *3.
Id
No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Id at *1.
Id
Id
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The plaintiff brought suit against Purdue and Abbott on October 31,
2003, alleging that the defendants' marketing campaign was misleading and
failed to warn about the addiction risks of OxyContin.149 The defendants moved
for summary judgment, claiming that the applicable two-year statute of
limitations had run.150 According to the defendants, the plaintiff knew by July
2001 that she was experiencing depression and addictive symptoms and was
required at that time to investigate the cause of her suffering.15 1
The court declared that it must determine when the plaintiff "should
have known that her injury was wrongfully caused."l 5 2 The court began by
stating that it must examine the spectrum of knowledge to determine the point
at which the statute of limitations would begin to run.15 3 At one end of the
spectrum, the statute could start to run as soon as the harm itself was
discovered, while at the other end the limitations period would not begin until
the plaintiff learned about the specific nature of the wrongful conduct, that is,
whether it was negligent, fraudulent, or something else.154 Rejecting both of
these extremes, the court concluded that a person knows, or reasonably should
know, that an injury was wrongfully caused when he possesses "sufficient
information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on
inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved." 55 Applying this
standard to the facts of the case, the court determined that the plaintiff would
have had a duty by July 2001 to investigate the causes of her injury and to
determine whether they may have involved wrongful conduct.'56 Since the
plaintiff filed her lawsuit more than two years after that date, the court ruled
that her claims against Purdue and Abbott were barred by the statute of

limitations.157
More recently, the plaintiff in Bayless v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc.'5 8
survived a defendant's motion for summary judgment.159 The plaintiff sought to
recover under the Connecticut Products Liability Act160 against Purdue for

149

Id. at *1-2.

Iso

Id. at *2.

151

Id.
id
Id
Id.

152
153
154
1
156
1

Id. at *3 (quoting Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (Ill. 1981)).
Id. at *5.

Id. at *7.

15

52 Conn. L. Rptr. 771 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011).

15

id.

160

CoNN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-572n(a) (2014).
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injuries suffered as the result of becoming addicted to OxyContin. 16
OxyContin was first prescribed by the plaintiffs doctor in February 1999 to
treat her back pain.162 At some point, she became addicted to the drug and after
March 2003 when her health insurance expired, she utilized illegal methods to
obtain OxyContin.16 3 In 2005, the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and later
attempted to commit suicide, was hospitalized and entered a methadone clinic
for treatment of opioid addiction.'" On March 6, 2009, she filed her lawsuit
against Purdue.16 s
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that
the plaintiffs claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 6 6
According to the defendant, the statute of limitations began to run when the
plaintiff had reason to believe that she was dependent upon or addicted to
OxyContin as early as 1999, or no later than 2006 when she began to
demonstrate knowledge that she was addicted to the drug. 6 7 In response, the
plaintiff argued that the statute began to run, not when she discovered that she
was addicted to OxyContin, but rather when she realized, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have realized, that Purdue misrepresented the addictive
character of the drug and breached the warranties related to it.168
The court declared that when the plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable
care should have discovered "actionable harm" was generally a question of fact
for the jury to decide.169 In addition, the court observed that the plaintiff had
alleged, inter alia, that Purdue had "misrepresented, marketed and promoted
OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse, dependence and diversion,
and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medication,
when it knew or should have known that this was false and misleading."o70 In
addition, the plaintiff had charged that Purdue failed to warn the plaintiffs
physician and other members of the medical community about the highly
addictive potential of OxyContin and had also withheld information from the
FDA, health care providers, pharmacists and patients, including the plaintiff,
about the health risks of the drug.' 7' In the court's view, all of these allegations
16'
162

Bayless, 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 771. Tina's husband and son also filed derivative actions. Id.
id

163

Id.

164

id

165

Id.

16
167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id.

Id.
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raised some doubts as to when the plaintiff should have known that OxyContin
was the cause of her injury.1 72 For this reason, the court concluded that there
was a genuine issue of fact about when the plaintiff discovered or should have
discovered that the defendant's conduct caused her addiction and the damages
that flowed from it. 173
II. CLASS ACTIONS

There have been a number of class actions brought in recent years by
OxyContin users against Purdue. 174 In a class action, a group of plaintiffs with
similar causes of action against a particular defendant or group of defendants
can sue through one or more representatives without each member of the class
having to individually join in the suit.'75 A class action does not necessarily
have to resolve the entire controversy; if necessary, a class action can be
limited to particular aspects of a broader dispute.' 76 A class action benefits
plaintiffs in several ways. First, all plaintiffs have an equal opportunity to assert
their claims in a class action.'7 7 Second, class members are only required to pay
a pro-rated share of the litigation costs, thereby enabling them to hire more
experienced attorneys to represent the class. 78 Finally, class action treatment
reduces the potential for conflicts of interest among the plaintiffs' attorneys. 7 9
In some cases, a class action might also be advantageous to a defendant. First, a
class action decreases the defendant's overall litigation costs because it does

172

id

Id
See DaWalt v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 397 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Purdue
Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.D.C. 2003); Campbell v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No.
1:02cv00163, 2004 WL 5840206 (E.D. Mo. 2004); Harris v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 218 F.R.D.
590 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Baker v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 219 F.R.D. 111 (S.D. Va. 2003);
Wethington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 218 F.R.D. 577 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Gevedon v. Purdue
Pharma, 212 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Ky. 2002); Foister v. Purdue Pharma, No. Civ.A. 01-268-DCR,
2002 WL 1008608 (E.D. Ky. 2002); Salisbury v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 166 F. Supp. 2d 546
(E.D. Ky. 2001); Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio 2004).
175 See Case Comment, FederalRules of Civil Procedure-Litigationof Mass Air
CrashesDistrict Court's Power to Certify and Conduct a Mass Accident Class Action Should Be
Expanded to ConserveJudicialTime andEnergy, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 427-28 (1975).
176 See 3 B. J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 123.01 (2d ed.
1974).
17
See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
178 See Robert C. Gordon, The Optimum Management of the Skywalks Mass Disaster
Litigation by the Use of FederalMandatory Class Action Device, 52 UMKC L. REv. 215, 22425 (1984).
179 See Note, ClassActions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1787, 1809 (1983).
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not have to litigate disputes brought by multiple parties in various forums. 80 In
addition, the use of class actions reduces the number of lawsuits involving the
same parties, issues or facts, and thereby promotes judicial economy.
Nevertheless, Purdue has successfully resisted class certification in OxyContin
cases.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth certain requirements that
must be met in order to bring a class action suit in federal court. 182 Rule 23(a)
sets forth four requirements: (1) numerosity of class members, (2) commonality
of legal or factual questions, (3) typicality of claims and defenses of the class
representative, and (4) adequacy of class representation.' 83 If these
requirements are satisfied, the case must also fall within one of the categories

specified in Rule 23(b).1 84
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that the class must be so numerous that joinder
is impracticable.18 s Rule 23(a)(2) requires that the litigation involve questions
of law or fact that are common to members of the class.186 Rule 23(a)(3)
declares that the claims of the class members be similar, though not necessarily
identical, to the claims of the representative party.' 8 7 Finally, Rule 23(a)(4)
requires adequacy of representation.'8 8 This involves consideration of the
availability of the representative party, the expertise of the representative
party's counsel, the extent of the representative party's interest and the absence
of any conflicting interests among class members.189 Plaintiffs bear the burden
of showing that these Rule 23(a) requirements have been met. 190

1so

See Case Comment, supranote 175, at 451.
See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982); Harris v. Purdue Pharma,
L.P., 218 F.R.D. 590, 592 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
18

182
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Of course, plaintiffs may also choose to bring an action in state court.
See, e.g., Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio 2004). Of course, the
defendant may try to remove the case from state court to federal court on diversity ground
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., DaWalt v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 395 (6th
Cir. 2005).
"' See Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1004 (8th Cir. 2004).
18
See Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
ProblemsofFairness,Efficiency and Control,52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 65-67 (1983).
185
See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 387 (D. Mass. 1979).
186
See Note, The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple
Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 153, 166 (1984).
187
Id. at 167.
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In addition, the plaintiff must satisfy one of the three requirements of
Rule 23(b).191 A class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(1) if the plaintiff
shows that separate actions by or against individual class members would risk
establishing "incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class," would be dispositive of the interests or nonparty class members or
would substantially impair the ability of nonparty class members to protect
their interests.192 Second, a class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if final
relief of an injunctive nature is appropriate.' 93 Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) permits a
class to be certified if common questions predominate over any questions
affecting only individual class members and if resolution of these questions in a
class action would be a superior method for the "fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy." 94
A number of OxyContin cases have been denied class certification
because the class representatives were unable to satisfy one or more
requirements of Rule 23(a). For example, in Campbell v. Purdue Pharma,
L.P.,19 5 the court refused to certify a proposed class because the plaintiffs were
unable to satisfy the numerosity requirement.196 David and Belinda Campbell
sought to represent a class consisting of all persons residing in the state of
Missouri who were prescribed OxyContin for any condition other than
moderate to severe pain caused by a terminal illness or non-chronic condition
who have suffered harm as a result, including dependence, addiction or
withdrawal symptoms.' The court began by observing that the plaintiffs did
not have to prove that it would be impossible to join all members of the
proposed class; they merely had to show that joinder would be difficult and
inconvenient.19 8 Nor would they have to establish that the precise number of
class members could be determined as long as it was possible to make a
reasonable estimate of their numbers.199
In an attempt to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff estimated that
there were "thousands" of persons in the putative class.20o However, the court

'91

Id.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614
(1997).
'
See Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 99 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
194 See Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615.
195
No. 1:02cv00163 TCM, 2004 WL 5840206 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
196
Id. at *4.
192

a 1

197

Id
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200
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responded that this was not sufficient to constitute a "reasonable estimate."20'
The plaintiff presented evidence that OxyContin sales nationally had increased
by over 1800% and that the drug was the number one prescribed Schedule II
narcotic in the country, with over 7 million prescriptions for the drug written in
2002.202 In view of the large number of OxyContin sales and prescriptions
nationally, the court concluded that it was reasonable to assume that there
would be sufficient members of the plaintiffs' proposed class to ensure that
joinder of individual plaintiffs would be both impractical and inconvenient. 20 3
However, there is a split of authority over whether national sales information is
sufficient to support a finding of numerosity.2 04
The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has been even more
troublesome for plaintiffs.205 For example, in Wethington v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., an Ohio federal district court refused to certi a class, in part because
the plaintiff had failed to establish commonality.2 0 The class consisted of
OxyContin users from Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana and West Virginia.208 The
plaintiffs argued that Purdue marketed and promoted OxyContin in a
misleading manner and that the company knew or should have known about the
harmful effects that their marketing and promotional practices would have. 209
In addition, they maintained that the company manufactured a defective
product that lacked an antagonist agent to prevent users from getting high when
they crushed and ingested the drug.210 Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that
Purdue should be held liable for failing to properly warn consumers about the
drug's side effects and for continuing to market it after the company became
aware of them. 2 11 Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the company concealed
facts about the harmful nature of OxyContin from the medical community and
201

id.

202

id
id

203

204
Compare Wethington v. Purdue Pharma. L.P., 218 F.R.D. 577 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (finding
that the numerosity requirement was satisfied), with Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma, 212 F.R.D. 338
(E.D. Ky. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff had not established numerosity), and Foister v. Purdue,
No. Civ.A. 01-268-DCR, 2002 WL 1008608 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff had not
established numerosity).
205
See Campbell v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1:02cv00163 TCM, 2004 WL 5840206, at *7
(E.D. Mo. 2004); Harris v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 218 F.R.D. 590, 596 (S.D. Ohio 2003);
Wethington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 218 F.R.D. 577, 589 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
206
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from the public.2 12 According to the plaintiffs, these allegations raised issues of
law and fact that were common to the class.2 13
Purdue, on the other hand, maintained that no common issues existed
because all of the plaintiffs' allegations related to the defendant's conduct and
ignored the individualized medical histories of the various class members.2 14
Furthermore, because the drug company did not engage in direct-to-consumer
advertising and directed their marketing efforts at physicians, it would be
necessary for the plaintiffs to show how each one was exposed to misleading
marketing and thereby misled. 215 Finally, because many of the class members
crushed or otherwise misused OxyContin, resolution of their cases would
depend on applicability of the product misuse defense in the various states
where they resided.2 16
Relying on the reasoning of Foister v. Purdue Pharna,L.P.,217 the

court noted that the factual circumstances of addiction are highly
individualized.2 18 It also concluded that the existence of the learned
intermediary doctrine might affect the validity of the claims of individual class
members. Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).2 19
A similar issue arose in Harrisv. Purdue Pharma,L.P. 2 20 The plaintiffs

in that case alleged that Purdue and Abbott misrepresented and minimized the
risks of addiction and directed their sales efforts at "opioid naYve" physician
and patients. 221 They also claimed that OxyContin's design was defective
because the drug failed to deliver sufficient amounts over the twelve-hour
period for which it was designed to provide pain relief.222 In addition, the
plaintiffs argued that Purdue failed to design the drug with a narcotic
antagonist.2 If an antagonist had been incorporated into the drug's
formulation, it would have reduced the hi h that would otherwise result from
defeating the drug's time-release feature. 2 4 The plaintiffs asked the court to
212
213

214
215
216
217
218
211
220

221
222
223
224
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order the defendants to institute a medical and prescription monitoring program
for OxyContin users in order to prevent and treat addiction. 2 25 The proposed
class consisted of all citizens of the United States for whom OxyContin was
prescribed and who are at risk for addiction but who have not yet suffered any
personal injury.226
Addressing the commonality issue, the court declared that all of the
plaintiffs' "central factual issues" were concerned with whether the defendants
misrepresented the efficacy or risks of OxyContin or promoted for
inappropriate uses.227 According to the court, these issues could only be
resolved on an individualized basis. As far as the misrepresentation claim was
concerned, the existence of the learned intermediary rule vitiated any common
marketing issues because it would require the parties to determine whether each
doctor was deceived by the defendants' alleged misrepresentation and as a
result prescribed OxyContin to a particular patient.228 As far as the design
defect claims were concerned, the court observed that any assertion of a misuse
defense by the defendants would require individualized inquiries with respect
to those class members who crushed or otherwise misused the drug. 229 Based
on this analysis, the court refused to certify the class because the plaintiffs
failed to meet the commonality requirement.230
Several courts have addressed the typicality requirement. 23 1 One of
these was the Campbell case, discussed earlier.232 The plaintiffs in that case
brought suit on behalf of a class consisting of all persons residing in the state of
Missouri who had taken OxyContin for any condition other than moderate to
severe pain caused by a terminal illness or non-chronic condition and who had
consequently suffered harm.233 Although the court rejected class certification
on commonality grounds, it also determined that the plaintiffs had not satisfied
Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement.234
The court began by stating that "[t]he typicality requirement primarily
focuses on whether the named plaintiffs claims have the same essential

225
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228

id
id.
Id. at 596.
id.

229

Id. at 597.

230

id
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Mo. 2004); Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma, 212 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Ky. 2002); Foister v. Purdue
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characteristics as the claims of the class at large and is designed to prevent an
instance where the legal theories of the named plaintiff may potentially conflict
with those of absent plaintiffs."235 The court then declared that it must examine
David Campbell's medical history in order to determine whether his claims
against Purdue were essentially the same as the claims of other class
members.2 36 These records revealed that between 1999 and 2003, Campbell had
obtained 436 prescriptions for OxyContin and numerous other synthetic
narcotics.237 Consequently, the court reasoned, the propriety of OxyContin
being prescribed for Campbell would necessarily require consideration of his
other medications.2 38 The other plaintiff, Campbell's spouse, Belinda, had a
similar medical history. During the same period, she obtained 247
prescriptions, including OxyContin and other opioids. 23 9 The court concluded
that the character of the plaintiffs' prescription drug use illustrated "the
individual nature of any inquiry into the essential element of causation, even as
to the 'typical' claims of the putative class representatives." 24 0 Accordingly, the
court determined that the Campbells' claims were not typical of the class
because of the varied dosages of OxyContin that they took, as well as their use
of other opioids and medications, and the availability of various affirmative
defenses.24 1
Rule 23's final requirement is adequacy.24 2 Although this requirement
has not been much of an issue in OxyContin litigation, it has come up on a few
24324
For example, in Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma,2 4 the plaintiffs
occasions.
sought to certify a class which included "[a]ll persons in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky who have obtained OxyContin and/or who obtain OxyContin in the
future."245 The court construed this to mean that the proposed class would
consist of persons who "obtained" OxyContin (legally or otherwise) and who
suffered addiction or other medical conditions.246 Although the court refused

235

Id. at *8 (quoting Dhamer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 183 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Ill.
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certification because of the lack of a definable, identifiable class, it decided to
consider if the Rule 23(a) requirements were met "out of an abundance of
caution. ,,247
Having concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish numerosity,
commonality and typicality, 248 the court turned to the issue of adequacy. It
endorsed the Sixth Circuit's two-part analysis from Senter v. GMC,249 which
required that "(1) [the representatives must] have common interests with
unnamed members of the class and (2) [it must appear that the representatives]
will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class though qualified counsel."2 50
The court observed that the complaint averred that the plaintiffs "will fairly and
adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because
Plaintiffs have no interest adverse to the interests of the Class." 2 5 1 The
complaint also declared that "[p]laintiffs have retained counsel experiences
[sic] and competent in the prosecution of class actions and complex
litigation. ,,252 However, the court concluded that these assertions merely
parroted the language of Rule 23(a)(4) and failed to provide any factual
evidence to support them.2 53 Consequently, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to meet the adequacy requirement and refused to certify the
class.254
Two other OxyContin class action cases are also worthy of note. The
first of these cases, Salisbury v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.,255 involved the
fraudulent joinder of two Kentucky pharmacies as defendants in order to strip
the federal court of its diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.256 The
plaintiff brought a class action in Kentucky state court against nine drug
companies and two pharmacies based on their manufacture, distribution or sale
of OxyContin. 2 57 The suit was removed to federal district court at the out-ofstate defendants' request, and the plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that the
parties were not completely diverse and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction
on diversity grounds.
247

Id. at 337.

248
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Citing a recent decision by the Sixth Circuit,25 9 the court declared that
fraudulent joinder was applicable:
(1) when there is no colorable basis for a claim against the nondiverse defendant, (2) when a plaintiff engages in outright
fraud in pleading jurisdictional allegations, and (3) when the
plaintiff joins a defendant who has no joint, several, or
alternative liability with a diverse defendant (and there is no
nexus between the claims against the diverse and non-diverse
defendant).26 0
According to the Salisbury court, the fraudulent joinder issue depended
on whether there was a reasonable chance that the non-diverse party would be
held liable to the plaintiff.26 1 The court found no such prospect of liability
between the pharmacies and the plaintiff because the plaintiffs complaint
failed to allege that the defendant pharmacies sold OxyContin to him. 62 n
addition, the court concluded that Kentucky's "middleman" statute 2 63 barred the
plaintiffs from recovering against the pharmacies even if they had sold
OxyContin to him. 26 Consequently, the court denied the plaintiffs request to
remand the case back to state court.265
In the second case, DaWalt v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.,266 a federal

appeals court ruled that it lacked the power to review a lower court's remand
order. 26 7 In 2001, the plaintiffs brought a class action against Purdue and
Abbott in state court, alleging "wrongful manufacture, marketing, promotion,
sale and distribution of OxyContin." 26 8 The plaintiffs sought compensation for
injuries stemming from OxyContin use, and asserted a claim for medical
monitoring. 269 At the same time, the plaintiffs sought to ensure that the suit
would remain in state court by stipulating that the claim for each member of the
class would not exceed $75,000, the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy
requirement for the diversity jurisdiction statute. 2 70 Nevertheless, the

259
260
261
262
263
264
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defendants sought to remove the case to federal court over the plaintiffs'
271
In an attempt to stay within the $75,000 limit, the plaintiffs
objections.
argued that the cost of their medical monitoring claims should not be taken into
account because they might be invalid under state law.272
Eventually, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that medical monitoring
claims were invalid absent proof of existing physical injury. 27 3 The federal
district court subsequently remanded the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.27 4 Sometime later, the Sixth Circuit held that Congress's adoption
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 required district courts to aggregate the claims of class
members for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy. 275 The district
court did not do this when it concluded that the plaintiffs' claims did not meet
the $75,000 requirement for diversity jurisdiction.27 6 After discussing a number
of decisions interpreting the power of appellate courts to review post-removal
decisions by lower courts, the court in DaWalt concluded that it did not have
the power to review the district court's decision to remand the case back to
state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction.27 7
III. PARENSPATRIAE LAWSUITS

Parenspatriae lawsuits brought against Purdue by state officials have
been far more successful than individual suits or class actions. In a parens
patriaeaction, the state contends that it has standing to sue to protect its "quasisovereign" interests. 2 78 A quasi-sovereign interest is one that is distinct from
the interests of particular parties and includes such things as an "interest in the
health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in
general." 279 The parenspatriae concept originated in England as an aspect of
the royal prerogative which enabled the Crown to act on behalf of people who
were unable to care for themselves or their property because of minority,
insanity or mental incapacity. 280 In recent years, state officials have invoked the
principle of parens patriae to sue tobacco companies in order to recoup some

271
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of the social costs that these products have caused, particularly to state
Medicaid programs.
Although these lawsuits were brought in the state's name, many of
them, particularly in the case of tobacco litigation, were actually financed and
managed by private law firms who were compensated on a contingent fee
basis. 82 Almost all of these lawsuits were eventually settled, in part because
defendants could not afford the high costs of extended litigation. 2 83 The largest
settlement involved the tobacco industry, which agreed to pay the states $206
billion over a 25-year period 2 84 and also agreed to various conditions respecting
the promotion and sale of its products. 28 5 The success of these suits against
tobacco companies led some states to bring similar actions against the
manufacturers of firearmS286 and lead paint.2 87
Litigants in these government lawsuits have relied on a variety of
liability theories, including unjust enrichment and restitution, negligent
entrustment, engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity, negligent
marketing and public nuisance.2 88 However, for the most part, the viability of
theories has not been tested in the courts because most of these cases have been
settled prior to trial.2 89 Furthermore, it should be mentioned that defendants

281
See generally Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public
Nuisance?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 825, 828-37 (2004).
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have sometimes been able to respond with defenses such as lack of standing,
lack of proximate cause, no duty, and failure to show a physical injury.290
Two of the most promising liability theories are negligent marketing
and public nuisance. Negligent marketing has already been discussed above. In
parens patriae cases, negligent marketing claims usually focus on the targeting
of vulnerable segments of the population and failure to supervise distribution of
the product at the retail level.2 9 ' Public nuisance is another popular liability
theory.29 2 A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with rights that are
held in common by the general public.29 3 The Restatement of Torts identifies
three factors that are relevant to whether interference is unreasonable.294 One
consideration is whether the defendant's conduct significantly interferes with
the public health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience.295 A second factor is
whether the defendant's conduct violates a statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation.2 96 A final concern is whether the conduct is of a continuing nature
or will produce a permanent long-lasting effect on the public right in
question. 297
Although a number of state attorneys general have brought suit against
Purdue, two lawsuits are particularly significant. The first involved the state of
West Virginia. In 2001, West Virginia's Attorney General filed suit against
Purdue based on its production, promotion, marketing and distribution of
OxyContin.2 98 The complaint accused the drug company of violating the state's
Consumer Credit Protection Act, maintaining a public nuisance, engaging in
negligent conduct and violating West Virginia's antitrust statutes. 29 9 The
complaint sought restitution for unjust enrichment, indemnity and an order
mandating medical monitoring for West Virginia OxyContin users. 30 0 The
complaint alleged that West Virginia state agencies incurred more than $30
million in OxyContin related costs between 1996 and 2003.301 It also charged
that Purdue's aggressive marketing of OxyContin caused excessive,
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inappropriate and unnecessary prescriptions of OxyContin to be written during
that period.3 02 As a result, the complaint declared, "citizens and consumers of
West Virginia, who have legitimately and legally paid for OxyContin, have
incurred actual damages and excessive costs." 303 In its complaint, West
Virginia sought "restitution and reimbursement sufficient to cover all costs
expended for health care services and programs associated with the diagnosis
and treatment of adverse health consequences of OxyContin use, including, but
not limited to, addiction due to defendants' wrongful conduct." 3 0 4 In addition,
the state requested compensation for all prescription costs for OxyContin that it
had incurred as a result of the defendants' wrongful conduct.30 s
Eventually, in November 2004 the case was settled for the
comparatively small sum of $10 million.306 The fact that West Virginia was
willing to settle for such a small amount suggests that the Attorney General's
lawyers realized that there was no assurance that the state would ultimately
prevail if the case went to trial. A particular concern was that a court would
conclude that misuse of OxyContin by drug abusers was a superseding cause
sufficient to break the chain of causation between Purdue's marketing activities
and the costs the state incurred to treat the effects of such abuse.30 7
Nevertheless, the West Virginia settlement apparently prompted 26 other states
and the District of Columbia to bring a class action against Purdue, accusing
the company of promoting off-label uses of OxyContin and failing to disclose
the diversion and addiction risks associated with the drug.30 s Purdue settled this
case in 2007 and agreed to pay the states $19.5 million. 30 9 In the settlement,
Purdue also agreed to a number of restrictions on future marketing practices
and managerial procedures. 3 10
In October 2007, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, along with Pike
County, brought suit against Purdue and Abbott. 3 1 1 The complaint alleged that
302
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the defendants' sales representatives marketed and promoted OxyContin to
medical care providers between December 1995 and June 2001 claiming that it
was "less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less likely to cause
tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications" despite the fact that
company officials knew that these assertions were false and misleading.312 The
complaint further declared that these misrepresentations and omissions
prevented physicians and patients from ascertaining the appropriate uses and
inherent risks of OxyContin and thereby induced physicians to prescribe the
drug more often than they otherwise would have. 1 As a result, a large number
of Kentucky residents became addicted to OxyContin and consequently
suffered serious health problems or engaged in criminal acts in order to obtain
the drug.3 14
Furthermore, the Commonwealth contended that the defendants'
wrongful marketing and promotion practices caused the state to pay for
unnecessary prescriptions and provide medical services that would not have
otherwise been required were it not for the defendants' deceptive practices. 315
In addition, Pike County alleged that it spent millions of dollars to "investigate,
apprehend, prosecute and incarcerate" individuals who have resorted to
criminal acts to support the cost of their addiction.316 Based on these
allegations, the complaint sought damages, indemnity, restitution, punitive
damages and equitable relief on the following grounds: (1) violation of the
state's Medicaid Fraud Statute;3 17 (2) violation of the Kentucky False
Advertising Statute; 3 18 (3) public nuisance; (4) unjust enrichment; (4)
negligence; (5) violation of state antitrust law; (5) strict liability; (6) common
law fraud; (7) as well as conspiracy and concert of action.3 19 The
Commonwealth relied on KRS § 15.060, which authorized the Attorney
General to recover funds that had been fraudulently paid out of the state
treasury.320
After the plaintiffs filed their case in state court, Purdue succeeded in
removing the case to the federal district court in the Eastern District of
Kentucky, claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

312

Id. at 594.

313

Id
id
Id.
Id.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 205.8463, 446.070 (LexisNexis 2013).

314

3
316
317
318

3
320

Id §§ 517.030, 446.070.
In re OxyContin, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
id
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and § 1332(d)(2)(A). 32 1 Later, in April 2008, the Multi-District Litigation panel
transferred the action to a New York federal district court for consolidation
with other OxyContin cases involving antitrust claims against Purdue. 322 The
reason for the removal to another court was that the plaintiffs had included an
antitrust claim against the defendants in their complaint. 323 Two years later,
Kentucky moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), to remand the case back to
the Kentucky state court where the action had originally been filed, claiming
that removal of the case from state court had been improper because the federal
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.324 Purdue opposed the motion on the
grounds that the district court had federal question jurisdiction and the case was
a putative class action that could be removed to federal court under the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).32 5 Thus began the long, and ultimately
successful, battle to have this case tried in state court.
The court began with the federal jurisdiction issue and observed that 28
U.S.C. § 1331 permits a defendant to remove a civil suit from state court to a
federal court if the action is deemed to be one "arising under" federal law.326
The court also declared that " the plaintiff s right to relief [on a state law claim]
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." 3 2 7
In this case, Purdue argued that some of the Commonwealth's claims required
the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 3 28 To resolve this issue,
the court followed the criteria set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Grable & Sons Metal Products,Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. 32 9 In that case, the
Court identified three conditions that were essential to federal jurisdiction:
"does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed
and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities. 330
As an initial matter, in other cases where state officials have sued drug
companies for reimbursement of Medicaid-related expenses, the court observed
that a great majority of federal courts ruled that they did not have federal

321
322
323
324

32
326
327

Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 595.
id
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2012).
In re OxyContin, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
Id. (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689-90

(2006)).
328
Id. at 595-96.
329

545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

330

id
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question jurisdiction and remanded the cases to state court.3 3 1 Turning to the
first of the Grable requirements, the court considered whether the plaintiffs'
state-law claims necessarily raised a federal issue.332 Purdue argued that the
complaint alleged two theories of fraud, indirect and direct, each of which
necessarily involved the question of whether Kentucky was "legally obligated"
to pay for unnecessary OxyContin prescriptions and related health care costs
under the federal Medicaid requirements. 3 According to Purdue, the
Commonwealth could not recover under its indirect theory of fraud, namely
that health care providers and patients reasonably relied on Purdue's alleged
misrepresentations, unless it was required under federal law to pay these
expenses.33 4 The fraud was indirect because Purdue allegedly lied to doctors
and patients rather than directly to the Commonwealth.
Purdue also maintained that under the direct theory of fraud, the
company failed to fully disclose material information to Commonwealth
officials about the addictive nature of OxyContin, an issue of federal law was
involved because Medicaid law severely restricted the state's ability to limit or
restrict coverage for any outpatient drugs subject to a Medicaid rebate
agreement. 3 According to Purdue, the direct fraud claim assumed that
Kentucky would not have paid for these OxyContin prescriptions had the
misrepresentations not occurred, but under federal law, the state would have
had to pay for the prescriptions even if Purdue had fully disclosed the risks of
addiction."
In response, the court disputed Purdue's contention that Kentucky
could not prevail under its indirect fraud claim without proving that federal law
required it to pay for the Medicaid-related expenses that it was seeking to
recover from the drug company. 3 The court declared that Purdue had failed to
produce "any relevant legal authority for the proposition that the
Commonwealth ... was legally obligated, under federal law or otherwise, to
pay for the Medicaid-related expenses it seeks to recover in order to prevail on
its indirect theory of fraud."33 9 Consequently, the court held that Purdue had
failed to show that the Commonwealth's assertion of its indirect fraud theory

331
332

In re OxyContin, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
Id. at 597.

3

Id. at 597-98.

334

Id. at 598.
Id. at 597-98.

1
336

33
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Id.
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necessarily raised a federal issue. 340 The court also ruled that it need not decide
whether the direct theory of fraud necessarily raised a federal issue. 34 1 It
reasoned that that since the Commonwealth could recover under the indirect
theory of fraud, which did not involve a federal issue, it did not matter whether
its alternative theory of direct fraud did involve such a question. 34 2
Turning to the second Grable requirement, the court concluded that
even if the Commonwealth's indirect theory of fraud necessarily raised a
federal issue, Purdue failed to show that this issue was disputed or
substantial.34 3 It noted that the Commonwealth did not dispute that it had a
legal obligation to reimburse Medicaid claims for OxyContin prescriptions. 3 "
Kentucky's claim, which was that Purdue wrongly triggered its obligation to
pay for OxyContin prescriptions, did not require an interpretation of the
Medicaid statute or an assessment of its obligation to pay under that statute.345
Instead, it merely required a court to determine whether Kentucky's claim had
any merit under state law.34 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the state's
lawsuit against Purdue did not raise a federal issue that was either disputed or
substantial.3 47
Finally, the court considered whether a federal forum could adjudicate
Kentucky's claim "without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities" and concluded that it could not.348
The court acknowledged that Congress has specifically required the states to
seek reimbursement of Medicaid funds from legally liable third parties, 34 9 but
pointed out it did not create a federal cause of action to recover these funds. 50
The court declared that this omission suggested that Congress intended for
these reimbursement suits to be brought in state courts.351 The court also
concluded that considerations of comity weighed against removing cases from

340

Id.

341

Id. at 599.

342

Id. (citing Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2005)).

343id
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Id.

345

Id. at 599-600.

346

Id. at 600.

347

id
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Id.

349

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
id

350
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Id.

§ 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2012)).
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state court unless some clear rule demanded it. 352 Thus, the court determined
that it lacked federal question jurisdiction according to the Grable decision.3 53
Purdue also argued that the Attorney General's lawsuit was properly
removed to federal court under CAFA because it was a class action.354 The
court noted that in order to be removable under CAFA, the matter in
controversy must exceed $5 million, there must be at least 100 plaintiffs in the
proposed class and the parties must be minimally diverse. 355 In addition, to be
removed, the action must qualify as either a class action or a mass action. 356
The court concluded that the lawsuit was not a class action because there were
only two plaintiffs involved.357 In doing so, the court rejected Purdue's claim
that Kentucky consumers were the real parties in interest.358 Instead, it declared
that the suit was a parens patriae action which sought to vindicate the state's
quasi-sovereign interests.35 9 Accordingly, it rejected Purdue's CAFA-based
analysis and ordered the case remanded to state court. 360
Undeterred by this defeat at the trial court level, Purdue sought to
the
lower court's ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 3 1 The
appeal
federal question issue was apparently dropped and the Purdue Court focused on
whether a parens patriaeaction, such as the one brought against the company
by the Kentucky Attorney General, was a class action and, therefore, removable
to federal court under CAFA.3 62 The court first observed that CAFA was
limited to "class actions" and "mass actions."363 Since Purdue did not contend
the issue of CAFA's
that the Kentucky lawsuit was a "mass action," ,
applicability depended upon whether it could be characterized as a "class
action" under the statute. According to the court, states generally filed suits
in federal court that could be described as either proprietary suits in which the
state sued in much the same capacity as a private party, "sovereignty suits" to
Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21
n.22 (1983)).
352

3

Id.

354

id

3

Id

356

Id. at 601.

357

id

(citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B), (d)(2)(A) (2012)).

Id. at 601-02.

358
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at 603.
See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 211 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 212.
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Id. at 214 n.5.
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determine such issues as boundary disputes or water rights, or parens patriae
suits to protect "quasi-sovereign" interests.
The court noted that the Attorney General sought to enforce the state's
rights under two separate statutes. The first of these, KRS § 446.070, created a
general private right of action on behalf of any person who was injured as the
result of a violation of statute.367 The second statute, KRS § 15.060, authorized
the Attorney General to institute legal action to recover "any fraudulent,
erroneous or illegal fee bill, account, credit, charge or claim" that had been
erroneously or improperly paid to someone out of the state treasury. 368 The
court concluded, neither of these statutes authorized a class action, nor did they
"bear any resemblance to Rule 23 .,,369 Furthermore, the court pointed out that
the complaint made no mention of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 23
(KRCP 23), the state law analog to the federal class action provision.3 70
Purdue argued that even though the complaint did not mention KRCP
23, the Attorney General was actually relying on its provisions to assert
representative claims for restitution on behalf of individual OxyContin users.
However, the court rejected this reasoning. It declared that under CAFA, a
class action was defined as a civil action "filed under" a state-law equivalent to
Rule 23.372 As the court exclaimed, "we are hard pressed to understand how a
suit may be 'filed under' a statute or rule that does not even appear on the face
of the complaint."3 73 Moreover, the court pointed out, a state-law equivalent to
Rule 23 must at least provide a procedure by which a member of a class whose
claim is typical of other class members can bring an action on behalf of himself
and all others in the class. 3 74 However, parenspatriae actions, such as the one
in question, had few, if any, class-like characteristics. 375 Accordingly, the court
concluded that "[i]n form as well as in function," parenspatriae suits were not
equivalent to Rule 23 as required by CAFA.3 76 Since the Attorney General's
suit was not a class action as defined by CAFA, the court determined that
Purdue's request to appeal should be denied. 1

366

Id. at 215 (citing Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2000)).

367

Id.
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Id. at 215-16.
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Id at 216.
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Id.
31 Id. at 216 n.7.
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id.
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Id. at 216.
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As of June, 2013, Pike County had settled its claims against Purdue for
approximately $4 million.3 8 The money was to be used to expand a planned
drug rehabilitation facility in the Pike County Justice Hall. 7 Meanwhile, the
Attorney General's suit against Purdue was progressing through the state
courts.310
IV. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Another potential solution to OxyContin abuse is to step up criminal
prosecutions of those who violate drug laws. In its early stages, the federal
government's "War on Drugs" focused on sale and use of illegal drugs such as
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. This resulted in the prosecution of thousands of
drug users in addition to producers and distributors. As a result, the prisons
quickly filled to overflowing with drug offenders and small-time drug
dealers." Unfortunately, this effort failed to significantly reduce illicit drug
use. This suggests that increasing criminal penalties for prescription drug abuse
or ramping up enforcement of drug laws will probably do little to curb the
abuse of drugs like OxyContin. However, enforcing criminal sanctions against
those who manufacture or supply products like OxyContin to drug abusers may
prove to be more productive than prosecuting drug abusers themselves. In the
case of OxyContin, the federal government has secured the conviction of a
number of drug companies, physicians and pharmacists for violating the
Controlled Substances Act and other statutes.

378
See Al Cross, Pike County Settles its Part of Oxycontin Lawsuit Against Purdue Pharma
for $4 Million; State Remains a Plaintiff KENTUCKY HEALTH NEWS (June 8, 2013),
http://kyhealthnews.blogspot.com/2013/06/pike-county-settles-its-part-of.html.
3
Id.
380
id
381 This phenomenon began around 1980. For example, between 1985 and
1996, the prison
inmate population increased 237% and the incarceration rate increased from 313 per 100,000 of
the general population to 615 per 100,000 during that period. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D.
Griffith, Do Three Strikes Law Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal
Incarceration,87 GEO. L.J. 103, 104 (1998). Much of this increase was due to the War on Drugs.
For example, drug offenders accounted for 80% of the increase of inmates in federal prisons
between 1985 and 1995. Id. at 107. The number of inmates incarcerated in federal prisons for
drug offenses rose from 4,900 to 51,737 between 1980 and 1995. Id There was an even greater
increase in the number of drug offenders in state prisons during this period. Id. Between 1980
and 1995, the number of inmates incarcerated for drug offenses in state prisons rose from 19,000
to 224,900. Id. This dramatic increase in the prison population was also due to the adoption in
many states of laws imposing longer sentences on habitual offenders. See Robert G. Lawson,
Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of a "Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93
KY. L.J. 305, 336 (2004).

THE FIGHTAGAINST PRESCRIPTIONDRUG ABUSE

2014]

A.

1157

CriminalProsecutionofPharmaceuticalCompanies

In the fall of 2001, the United States Attorney's Office for the Western
District of Virginia began a criminal investigation of Purdue in connection with
its marketing of OxyContin in Virginia.38 2 The investigation showed that
OxyContin prescriptions increased from 300,000 to six million per year in the
state between 1996 and 2001 .383 In addition, oxycodone-related deaths rose
400% in Virginia during the same period.384 As the result of this investigation,
Purdue was charged with misbranding of a drug with intent to defraud and
mislead.85 The basis of this charge was that Purdue had claimed that
OxyContin was less addictive than other forms of oxycodone."' In 2007,
Purdue agreed to plead guilty to the misbranding charge, a felony, and three of
its executives pled guilty to a lesser charge of "misbranding a drug."3 87 In its
plea agreement, Purdue agreed to pay more than $600 million in fines and other
monetary penalties. 8 In addition, Purdue's President and COO, Executive
Vice President and Chief Legal Officer and Executive Vice President of
Worldwide Medical Affairs were each required to pay a $5,000 criminal fine as
well as $19 million, $8 million and $7.5 million respectively to the Virginia
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's Income Fund.389 Furthermore, after the plea
agreement was accepted, the Department of Health and Human Services issued
an order excluding the Purdue executives from participating in any federal
health care program, including Medicare and Medicaid for a period of 20
years. 390 This was later reduced to 12 years. 39 1
B.

CriminalProsecution ofPrescribingPhysicians

In 2001, the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) initiated
a campaign known as the "OxyContin Action Plan" to investigate and

382
383

Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 100-101 (D.D.C. 2010).
Frederickson, supra note 2, at 136.
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id.
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See Andrew C. Baird, Comment, The New Park Doctrine: Missing the Mark, 91 N.C. L.
REv. 949, 983 (2013).
387
United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 570 (W.D. Va. 2007).
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Frederickson, supra note 2, at 138.
389
Id. at 138. Purdue actually made these payments pursuant to an indemnification agreement
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between the company and its senior corporate officers. Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98,
102 n.7 (D.D.C. 2010).
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Friedman, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 102-03.
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prosecute doctors for improper prescribing of OxyContin.39 2 The principal basis
for these prosecutions was violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
The CSA allows only those who are registered "practitioners" with the DEA to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance, such as OxyContin.39 3 Moreover,
even registered practitioners are subject to criminal liability unless the
prescriptions they write are issued for a "legitimate medical purpose" and the
prescribers are acting "in the usual course of their professional practice." 394
Thus, a physician may be held criminally liable if he or she ceases to distribute
or dispense controlled substances as a medical professional and instead acts as

a drug "pusher." 3 95
Not surprisingly, many of the reported cases have hinged on whether
the defendant physician prescribed OxyContin for a legitimate medical purpose
and in the course his or her professional practice. 9 In addition to unlawful
distribution charges, federal prosecutors have also charged some physicians
with unlawful distribution of controlled substances resulting in death,397
conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances,
money
laundering,399 and health care fraud.400
As might be expected, defendants have raised a number of defenses,
including ineffective counsel,40 1 self-incrimination,4 02 unlawful search and

Hoffnann, supra note 10, at 280-81.
39
21 U.S.C. § 823 (2012). OxyContin is a Schedule II controlled substance under the CSA.
21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(1)(xiii) (2013).
394
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04.
395
See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 138 (1975).
392

396
See, e.g., United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1228-29 (1lth Cir. 2012); United
States v. Rosenberg, 585 F.3d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550,
556 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 475 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1308
(11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 690 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Sawaf, 129 Fed. App'x 136, 142 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F.
Supp. 2d 316, 321-22 (D.P.R. 2007).
397
See, e.g., Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1219; McIver, 470 F.3d at 552; Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 467;
Williams, 445 F.3d at 1304.
398
See, e.g., McIver, 470 F.3d at 552; Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 467; Alerre, 430 F.3d
at 684;
Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
See, e.g., Alerre, 430 F.3d at 684; Valdivieso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
4
See, e.g., Ignasiak,667 F.3d at 1219; United States v. Chube, 538 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.
2008); Williams, 445 F.3d at 1304.
401
See, e.g., Alerre, 430 F.3d at 688; United States v. Sawaf, No. 6:01-47-KKC,
6:09-7104KKC, 2013 WL 1311395, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2013).
02
See, e.g., Valdiveiso Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
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seizure,403 violation of the Confrontation Clause,404 and improper sentencing.40 5
However, most cases involved one of two issues: (1) whether testimony or jury
instructions about "professional practice" confuses the standard of proof in a
criminal case with the civil standard of proof in a civil malpractice case; and (2)
whether "good faith" is a defense to criminal liability for unlawful distribution.
Since prescribing physicians are subject to criminal liability under the CSA
only if they knowingly and intentionally act "outside the course of professional
practice" and without a "legitimate medical purpose,"406 it is often necessary
for a court to determine what constitutes professional practice in order to
compare it with the defendant's conduct. This usually requires expert testimony
and the parties often disagree about the propriety of using large quantities of
opioids to treat chronic pain.407
A recurring issue is whether evidence of the defendant's departure
from the generally recognized practices and procedures of the medical
profession can be introduced to show that the defendant's activities fell outside
of the usual course of professional practice as required to prove a violation of
the CSA.408 For example, in United States v. Alerre,409 the prosecution's expert
witness testified that the defendants' prescription practices, which he described
in detail, failed to meet the ordinary standard of care and constituted
"illegitimate medicine."410 After their conviction, the defendants appealed,
arguing, inter alia, that this testimony conflated the criminal standard with the
civil standard of proof and resulted in their being tried for and convicted of
civil malpractice instead of the criminal distribution of drugs. 4 1 1 However, the
court declared that evidence that a physician departed from the civil standard
should not automatically be excluded.4 12 Instead, it concluded in this case that
that "evidence that a physician consistently failed to follow generally

See, e.g., Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 469-70.
See, e.g., Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1229-35.
405
See, e.g., United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2006); Williams, 445
F.3d at 1310-11; Alerre, 430 F.3d at 696; United States v. Sawaf, 129 Fed. App'x 136, 143-46
(6th Cir. 2005).
406
United States v. Chube, 538 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2008).
407
See generally Hoffinann, supra note 10, at 284-89.
408
See United States v. Rosenberg, 585 F.3d 355, 357-58 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 556-61 (4th Cir. 2006); Feingold,454 F.3d at 1009-13; United States v.
Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2006); Alerre, 430 F.3d at 690-92.
409
430 F.3d at 681.
410
Id. at 686.
411
Id. at 691.
403
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recognized procedures tends to show that in prescribing drugs he was not acting
as a healer but as a seller of wares."413
A related issue is whether a physician may avoid liability for violating
the CSA by claiming that he or she acted in "good faith." 414 United States v.
Hurwitz4 15 provides a good analysis of this issue. Dr. Hurwitz was convicted of
multiple counts of drug trafficking for prescribing very high doses of
OxyContin and other opioids.416 In his appeal, the defendant argued that the
trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on good faith as a defense to
the drug trafficking charges.4 17 The appeals court agreed, declaring that " a
doctor's good faith generally is relevant to a jury's determination of whether a
doctor acted outside the bounds of medical practice or with a legitimate
medical purpose when prescribing narcotics.'218 Therefore, it held that the
defendant was entitled to raise the question of good faith. 4 19 At the same time,
the court declared that the standard for evaluating a doctor's good faith was an
objective one. 420 As the court pointed out, to recognize a subjective standard of
good faith would allow a physician to substitute his or her views on what
constituted good medical practice for standards that were generally recognized
and accepted would seriously undermine federal drug enforcement laws.42'
Accordingly, the court ruled that the trial court was not required to accept the
defendant's proposed good faith jury instruction because it set forth a
subjective rather than an objective standard.42 2 Nevertheless, the court held that
jury instructions the trial court did adopt were prejudicial to the defendant and
reversed his conviction.423
Finally, UnitedStates v. Valdivieso Rodriguez4 24 presents an interesting
professional practice issue. In this case, the government charged seven
physicians in Puerto Rico with dispensing controlled substances through the

Id
See United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 476-83 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2006).
415
459 F.3d at 463.
416
Id. at 466.
417
Id. at 475-76.
418
Id at 476.
419
Id. at 480.
420
Id at 478. But see Deborah Hellman, ProsecutingDoctorsfor Trusting Patients, 16 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 701, 709 (2009) (criticizing the court's adoption of an objective good faith
standard).
421
Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 479.
422
Id. at 480.
423
Id. at 482.
424
532 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D.P.R. 2007).
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Internet to individuals in the absence of a doctor-patient relationship.4 25 The
defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that Puerto Rico's Telemedicine Law
allowed them to provide prescriptions to nonresidents of the Commonwealth
and, therefore, their conduct did not fall outside the scope of professional
practice.4 26 The court declared that the government should be allowed to prove
that the defendants' prescribing practices, taken as a whole fell outside the
bounds of professional practice. 427 Apparently, the court felt that this issue was
not foreclosed by the fact that Internet sales of prescription drugs were
authorized by the Puerto Rico statute.
C.

CriminalProsecution ofPharmacists

Pharmacists are also subject to criminal prosecution for aiding in the
diversion of prescription drugs.4 8 In addition, state regulatory agencies may
impose civil fines or revoke their licenses for violating drug laws. 42 9 One area
of interest is the prescribing practices of Internet pharmacies. 4 30 A recent
federal case, United States v. Tobin,4 3 1 involved the legality of Internet
pharmacies which dispensed controlled substances (but apparently not
OxyContin) without requiring customers to submit medical records or
prescriptions.4 32 From 2002 to 2005, one of the defendants owned and operated
a company called Jive Network which sold prescription drugs through
numerous Internet sites.4 33 During that period, Jive Network sold approximately
45 million Schedule III and Schedule IV pills, generating $85 million or 80%
of the company's revenue during that period.434
In 2008, the government charged the owner of the pharmacy, along
with three physicians and a pharmacist, with distributing Schedule III and IV
drugs without a prescription as well as with a host of other crimes.435 At trial, it
was revealed that one of the medical doctors approved 40,000 orders for

425

Id at 319.
Id. at 321.
427
Id. at 322.
428
Ken Lammers, Jr., Rise of the Pills, 15 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 91, 107 (2011).
429
See, e.g., Ala. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Holmes, 925 So. 2d 203, 207 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005);
Tewelde v. La. Bd. of Pharm., 93 So. 3d 801, 812-13 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
430
See Amy L. Caldwell, Note, In the War on PrescriptionDrug Abuse, E-PharmaciesAre
Making DoctorShopping Irrelevant, 7 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 85, 104-08 (2006).
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controlled substances and spent as little as six seconds reviewing individual
customer orders.436 Another doctor approved more than 60,000 orders and
spent as little as nine seconds on each order.4 37 The third physician was a bit
more conscientious, spending about nineteen seconds per patient reviewing
customer orders.438 The defendant pharmacist filled more than 21,000 of these
prescriptions.43 9 The jury convicted all of the defendants and they appealed.44 0
On appeal, the defendants made two arguments. First, they contended
that the CSA was unconstitutional because of vagueness." 1 In addition, they
maintained that the rule of lenity should be applied to them.442 In support of
their "void for vagueness" claim, the defendants pointed out that the CSA did
not explicitly prohibit the distribution of controlled substances over the Internet
until 2008, when Congress enacted the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy
Consumer Protection Act 44 3 as an amendment to the CSA. 4 4 4 The defendants
also argued that the CSA was unconstitutionally vague because it did not
expressly state that an in-person patient visit was required to obtain a valid
prescription over the Internet." The court was not persuaded by either of these
arguments and upheld the constitutionality of the CSA.4 6
The defendants also tried to invoke the rule of lenity as a defense.
The rule of lenity is intended to provide a fair warning of potential liability by
"resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly
covered.'" 8 The defendants claimed that the CSA was ambiguous in two
respects: (1) it did not clearly specify that it applied to distributions of
controlled substances over the Internet; and (2) it was ambiguous about
whether it required a physician to have an in-person patient visit before
providing a prescription over the Internet." 9 However, the appeals court
rejected both of these arguments, declaring that the CSA criminalized the
distribution of controlled substances without a valid prescription, regardless of
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the method of distribution.45 0 As far as the defendant's second argument was
concerned, the court concluded that the CSA deferred to state standards of
professional practice, including state requirements with respect to
prescriptions. 4 5 1 Finally, the court held that the government did not have to
prove that the defendants acted "willfully"; rather, it was sufficient to show that
they acted "knowingly," that is, that their actions were voluntary and
intentional and not the result of an accident or mistake.4 52 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the defendants' convictions.45 3
V. ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION
A.

Problems with a Litigation-OrientedStrategy

As the foregoing discussion suggests, civil litigation has not been very
successful, particularly for former OxyContin users. As far as civil litigation is
concerned, Purdue has pursued a policy of refusing to settle individual lawsuits
and has prevailed at the summary judgment stage in most of them. One reason
for the drug company's success is that many of these plaintiffs are drug abusers
who generate little sympathy from trial court judges.4 54 In addition, Purdue has
been able to shift much of the blame to "pill doctors" who have prescribed
OxyContin in excessive quantities to their patients, arguing that their
prescribing practices broke the chain of causation. 4 5 5 In addition, Purdue has
persuaded some courts that overriding OxyContin's time-release mechanism by
chewing or crushing the pills constitutes misuse or alteration of the product.4 56
Finally, a number of these individual lawsuits were dismissed because the
plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute of limitations.457 Class actions have
also been ineffective, primarily because class representatives have been unable
to get their putative classes certified. This failure is largely due to the inability
of class representatives to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a).4 58
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On the other hand, Purdue has been forced to settle a number of parens
patriae suits brought against it by state officials. 459 In particular, Purdue paid
the state of West Virginia $10 million to settle negligent marketing and public
nuisance for violating provisions of the CSA, and in some cases, for engaging
in health care fraud and other illegal activities.4 60 These efforts have
undoubtedly had some deterrent effect on those who contributed to the
OxyContin abuse problem. Pill mills have been closed down and doctors have
become more cautious about prescribing opioids to treat chronic pain. Indeed,
some have complained about the chilling effect that high-profile arrests and
prosecutions have had on those who engage in legitimate pain management
practices.461 Another unintended consequence of the DEA's campaign against
prescription drug abuse is that it may have forced drug abusers to turn from
prescription drugs like OxyContin to unregulated street drugs like cocaine or
heroin. 462
B.

Regulatory Alternatives to Litigation

Commentators have suggested a number of regulatory measures to curb
prescription drug abuse and some of these measures have been adopted in a few
states. 4 63 These include prescription monitoring programs, anti-doctor shopping
legislation and unused prescription drug collection initiatives.464 Under
prescription monitoring programs, a state agency maintains a database
containing information about prescriptions of narcotic or other controlled
substances. Physicians would be able to access this database to determine if a
patient has obtained prescriptions from other doctors.465 The effectiveness of
such monitoring programs can be increased even more if they can interact with
similar databases in other states as well. 466 Anti-doctor shopping laws are more
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F.R.D. 577, 589 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (commonality); Gevedon v. Purdue Pharma, 212 F.R.D. 333,
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controversial because they criminalize the act of obtaining prescriptions
through fraud. However, it is interesting to observe that Florida has enacted
such a law. 4 67 A third approach is to establish a program to enable individuals
to deposit unused prescription drugs as designated collection centers. 4 68 The
DEA currently maintains collection centers for this purpose. 4 69 Hopefully, these
"take back" programs will increase the number of unwanted drugs that are
disposed of properly and not diverted to illegal uses.470
CONCLUSION

This Article has discussed the effectiveness of various forms of
litigation as a tactic in fighting prescription drug abuse, especially as it relates
to the overprescribing of OxyContin. Suits against Purdue by individual
consumers have almost always failed because the company has successfully
argued lack of causation, misuse, wrongful conduct and expiration of the
statute of limitations. Class actions have also failed, primarily because class
representatives have been unable to satisfy the Rule 23 requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. Parenspatriaesuits against
Purdue have been somewhat more successful, despite the weakness of their
doctrinal foundations, primarily because the company has chosen to settle these
suits in order to avoid the bad publicity and expense of protracted litigation.
Nevertheless, the overall effectiveness of civil litigation in this area is highly
questionable.
The criminal prosecution of Purdue forced it to change some of its
promotion and marketing practices. In addition, the federal government's
prosecution of numerous doctors, pharmacists and other health care providers
seems to have discouraged others from overprescribing OxyContin and other
opioids. All of this seems to have reduced OxyContin abuse, at least for now.
Nevertheless, these litigation-based efforts are not enough and they must be
supplemented by other measures such as comprehensive prescription
monitoring programs, anti-doctor shopping laws and prescription drug "take
back" initiatives.
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